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America's Army Reserve - A Bridge to 2010: A Systems Approach

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department Of the Navy.

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## ABSTRACT

As our Nation rushes into the twenty-first century America's Army will continue to play a critical role. As a member of America's joint warfighting team, we will continue to provide our unique core attribute of dominating and sustaining events on land into year 2010 and beyond. America's Army is comprised of the active component, two reserve components (RC) (United States Army Reserve and Army Reserve National Guard) and the Department of the Army civilian workforce. Nowhere, do you get a better snapshot of American society, its ideals and more importantly it's diversity. The key remains confidence!

Operational art is evolving to the reality that significant mindsets must change to meet the dynamic and lethal challenges across the full spectrum of required capabilities in the next century. While **space, time, and forces** continue to influence the operational and tactical commanders sandbox, the factor of "**time**" will always be the fulcrum of application and decision-making. Current access, command and control, and redundant overhead only adds to the "fog" when applying reserve component capabilities into the operational decision-making matrix.

The question is not whether we will use the RC, but how to best integrate their capabilities into tomorrow's spectrum of challenges and reduce the bureaucratic impediments (fog not needed) therefore placing confidence in the gaining commanders essential planning factor of "**time**". Combining the two reserve components, will help.

## INTRODUCTION

Whenever our national interests or core values are at stake, this nation's will, resolve, staying power and support can be measured by the active participation of the Reserve Components (RC).<sup>1</sup> This is not by chance. After Viet Nam, General Abrams set out to so intertwine the three components, it would force the President to get congressional support but more importantly, "the will of the people." "If we're ever going to war again, we're taking the reserves with us."<sup>2</sup> Culmination of these efforts was The Total Force Policy<sup>3</sup> implemented by the Department of Defense in 1973. Harry Summers, noted military veteran and historian has, on numerous occasions, reminded us that part of our failure in Viet Nam was not mobilizing the bulk of the RC to gain national support. Desert Storm solidified these theories:

"Not only would such a force (Total Force) get the Congress on board, it would get the American people on board as well. The citizen-soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve serve as bridge between the American people and their military."<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Arnold Punario, Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee stated "The active services had already gone to war, but the nation didn't go to war until the Guard and Reserve were mobilized."<sup>5</sup>

" . . . only when the RC was mobilized did the public support climb from 50 to 80 per cent."<sup>6</sup>

Our Nation's reluctance for large standing armies is embedded into our constitution. In view of over 222 years of military experience, a matured democracy, and global leadership responsibilities it is time for a serious relook at our Reserve Component (RC) structure. Corporate America downsizes and

retools based on market demands and analysis. Old products die, or are rightsized due to competition using a "systems approach." No one can argue that our product (military capabilities) hasn't been part of our enduring democracy and global influence. As with Corporate America we must rightsize through efficiency and effectiveness (typically technology, decision-making and overhead) while increasing or maintaining our product. I will argue that our current system (Active, USAR and ARNG components) is bogged down in overhead, disjointed technological systems, and impaired decision-making. Now is time to initiate plans to combine the two reserve components.

The era of downsizing **is not** over. The demand for quality product survivability forces a critical "systems" approach to downsizing. The demand for other societal products (social) coupled with a balanced budget agenda will force DOD to maintain a credible capabilities based product with less resources. Make no mistake about it, DOD is the billpayer for the infamous bridge into the next century. Leveraging efficiency and effectiveness (a systems approach) is not a choice when your threat (**input**) is more diverse, while resources are reduced, yet the product must be credible (**output**). As we approach a new era of military capabilities, we must face the fact that our ability to master

"time" is severely hampered by functional lines of operations that oppose efficiency and effectiveness.

This paper will take a critical look at only one of the many systems within DOD that will surface in the next few years -- the Composition of America's Army. Based on current (and evolving) threats and required capabilities, the demand for our product will not diminish. Maintaining a credible force (unlike the hollowness of the seventies) with reduced resources (manpower and dollars) can only be achieved through enhanced technological systems integration, and a reduction of redundant overhead thus easing the decision-making burdens of civil-military authorities.

America's Army must combine the two RCs (USAR & ARNG) and fully integrate the mobilization and personnel systems to master "time." Our ability to influence future global affairs (space-time-forces) is critical to time and the decision-making capabilities of our leaders, both civil and military. A systems approach will reveal that the nation is paying for a somewhat marginally effective but disjointed and inefficient RC system. Balancing the checkbook of the twenty-first century will demand a pragmatic review of how efficiently we produce our product vice the rhetoric of the established power brokers.

**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY - SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT - FORCES**

It is clear that all of the tenants and tasks in support of our national military objectives - **promoting stability and thwarting aggression** - involve the Reserve Components (RC). The latest Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) provides additional (explicit) planning and programming guidance to the services. Specifically the DPG directs the Army to program for fifteen enhanced readiness combat brigades (ARNG) and maintain enough RC combat support and combat service support (cs/css) for the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency (MRC) scenarios. Additionally, it tasks the Army to develop initiatives that leverage the capabilities of the RC to reduce AC optempo during peace. While the NMS has provided a broad template, the guidance is directive in the DPG, and is realized in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).<sup>7</sup> A quick review of these documents (our roadmap to execute NMS objectives) will reflect a significant mismatch of RC forces and capabilities as validated in Total Army Analysis (TAA 98-03).<sup>8</sup> The largest mismatch are the eight ARNG combat divisions which are not apportioned in the JSCP. This comes at a time when TAA reflects combat support/combat service support (cs/css) manpower shortfalls (both individuals and units) for the two nearly simultaneous MRC scenario. The Army could easily address this shortfall if

politics were put aside. Publishers of these documents have been extremely careful in the protection of old traditions (political rice bowls) and leaving ambiguity to protect obsolete and redundant force structure. Using vague terms such as "a deep strategic hedge" to salvage or maintain some relevance for the ARNG divisions is purely political. As stated before roots and traditions run deep. There are tons of articles (pro and con) arguing political means to meet lethal ends. While our RC structure is marginally effective, there is no doubt that it is extremely inefficient and highly political (roots). If the intent is to evolve into the next century, than it needs to be a planned journey (visionary, relevant and affordable) vice a gas guzzling adventure.

**The RC link** - This paper is limited to the operational and strategic efficiencies that ultimately effect "**time**." Trading "**space**" for "**time**" as we go into the next century is becoming less and less viable as the dynamics of response times decreases. However, this quick excursion into force structure intuitively points to potential structure gains across the full spectrum of domestic and global strategic objectives. This translates to approximately \$2 billion over the next five years as reported by a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study.<sup>9</sup> I would



contend that this CBO study is much too limited and doesn't address the real problems of systems integration, convoluted command and control, and excess combat structure. I would submit that the savings would be at least \$2 billion per year,<sup>10</sup> and when added to the elimination of excess combat structure another \$2 billion per year could be achieved.<sup>11</sup>

#### **HISTORY AND POLITICS - Constitutional Roots**

It is clear that the RC is an integral piece of America's Army as are its contributions to the NMS. In perspective, the most important attribute may be the bridge to American society. So, why the dilemma? The next few paragraphs will provide a cursory review of the historical and political barriers that continue to **place tradition over efficiency**. This will provide a rudimentary foundation of why this may be a bridge to far, if we continue to stay in the box.

The contributions of the RC (citizen soldier) to this Nation in times of peace or war are immeasurable. Volumes of documented contributions whether it be blood, leadership, ideas or support are the basis for extreme pride and heritage.<sup>12</sup> There are no bad guys. The roots of the militia (ARNG) and later the Army Reserve (USAR) are tied (I say mired) to eighteenth-century national policies and interests. The maturity (state verses national

interests), dynamics, affordability and capabilities of the twenty-first century can no longer be held hostage to the political bickering of our RC.

Lack of a clear focus or vision, a pending balanced budget horizon and posturing for relevance has seen the recent proliferation of tit-for-tat articles between the passionate partisans of both reserve components. As goes the traditional resource battle among the services, so goes the battles among the RC. What is at stake, is the RC budget which accounts for approximately fourteen percent of the total Army budget.<sup>13</sup> This is not new. Since the inception of a federal reserve force (currently the USAR) in 1903 and the existing state militia forces (currently the ARNG) we have been plagued by our inability to hurdle the political compromises. Besides numerous Congressional policy changes (1903 through present), the first formal bipartisan study to review relevance, gain unity and efficiency was attempted in 1947. The Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appointed a board<sup>14</sup> (Gray Board) which concluded that the dual status of the National Guard was detrimental to national security. The Gray Board recommended merging the National Guard with the Organized Reserve Corps.<sup>15</sup> This formalized the official

emergence of competition between the two reserve components as we know them today. The battle lines are still drawn.

**Self sustaining bureaucracies** - This recent proliferation<sup>16</sup> of the snipe-hunts amplifying the historic tension is a clear indicator of the battle lines being fortified as we all (all components) stand in the food chain for resources. These battle lines intuitively rise and fall with each budget cycle and as we go into the next century, **efficiency** will dictate **one reserve component**. This perpetual sham pits America's Army at the doorstep of lobbyists, interest groups and Congress to salvage emotions and alliances to maintain a backward looking (historical heritage) vice an affordable and efficient twenty-first century Army. The roots run deep. As with any large oak tree, constant maintenance is needed. It is time to prune the tree, cut some roots in order to remain strong and more importantly, nurture the remaining roots to everyday America.

**A time to reflect** - As we have done in the past for many great formations, ships or battlefields, it is time to eulogize and remember our historical contributions through memorials, museums, and enduring regimental societies and/or organizations. The rich heritage and lineage of all contributions need not be debated of "who-did-more or one-upsmanship" at the expense of

others. Our common denominator remains America's Army. There are no enemies in this battle, only rich heritage.

#### **THE SYSTEM - Three Armies**

As with any product our ability to gain efficiency and competitiveness rests in our ability to analytically scrutinize our efforts using a systems approach. Our simple and practical model is made up of three boxes, input, process, and output. Input (**the threat**) is relatively easy to identify and quantify. Derived from NSSD, NMS and the JSPS (specifically the JPD and DPG) our threat has been provided. Our required output (**capabilities**) has also been provided by the same documents. Therefore our focus and variable product efficiencies (cost, decisions, infrastructure and risk) can only be accomplished in the process box. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. The key cogs of the process box are the Constitution, Title 10, three separate armies, and most importantly, money. The process box is affected by both internal and external forces. Although target rich for fodder, I must limit this paper to the most obvious and costly distracter, thus creating the best efficiencies and cost savings.

**The Process box** - The process box is our center of gravity as it is with and profit or non-profit entity. It is composed of

dollars (decreasing), and the life cycle costs factors of three separately administered Army components (decreasing). Our only billpayer is excess combat structure, separate command and control overhead, and separate administrative overhead. Drivers for the next century will be reduced dollars and structure while increasing capabilities with our most critical factor to the decision-maker being "time."

#### **EFFICIENCY VS EFFECTIVENESS**

At best, America's Army, specifically the RC, is marginally effective.<sup>17</sup> This marginal effectiveness is gained through redundancy and extremely hard working soldiers in all components. All are not equal, but all work equally hard. Readiness, training and mobilization can and must be the benefactor of a much more efficient system.

Efficiency has many nodes in America's Army, yet each node has its own language, rules and protocol. While marginally effective, the resource availability for the next century will force efficiency. Not only is our RC force mismatched to the NMS, the overhead alone burdens the Army leadership, the taxpayers and the soldier. Several random thoughts:

- Command and Control (C2) - Peace, war, state emergency, national emergency, training, and administrative lines are all

competing vice being homogenous. A command and control briefing for the listed scenarios would give the listener a headache. More important, comprehension would be limited and the audience probably wouldn't believe it. A rule of thumb derived from operational planning implies that if it takes more than five minutes and more than two charts your C2 is flawed.

" A simple story - My National Guard unit has its senior leadership comprised of several states. Not only is my unit fragmented but our divisional structure (Bdes-Bns) are located in several states. My Division Commander is two states away and his authority to command our division is limited to my state (an MOU exists) and not the others. Are state militias relevant to the intent of our Constitutional fathers or an illusion of our times? ARNG continues to hang its tired hat on this nation's constitutional framework yet it actively violates its intention every day. By the way, once federalized the chain of the command is the same as the Army Reserve's.<sup>18</sup>"

- Personnel Administration - There is absolutely no reason that our personnel systems cannot be compatible nor centrally managed. Technology has passed us by.

"I left active duty several years ago and joined my local Army Reserve unit. It took almost one year to consolidate most (I never got all) my records. Even though my records were electronic they couldn't be passed to the Army Reserve's electronic data base. This by the way, affected my selection for professional development (schooling). Alas, I got enrolled, but a year late. About eighteen months later, I wanted to get back into a combat arms unit, so I left the Army Reserve and joined a National Guard combat unit about sixty miles from my hometown. Loved it and got a

chance to strut my combat stuff, if you know what I mean. It was great but my complete record never quite caught up to me and I had my third child. My wife's calling was higher so I left the Guard and returned to my local Army Reserve unit to eliminate my commute. I go to the promotion board in two months and I still don't have my complete file."

These stories are typical of the current environment. **Three separate "Personnel systems"** convoluted and **opposing command and control structures** and more importantly - **competing interests**.

While feeble attempts are made by all components to synergize efforts and pacify or give the illusion of progress and efficiency, the food-chain for resources is getting longer.

While I can't argue all the potential efficiencies in this paper, it should be intuitive from the sampling above that efficiencies are inevitable. Other candidates are Equipment Maintenance and Storage, Supplies and Equipment, Facilities and Installation Management, Training, and numerous redundant state verses federal issues.

- Operational Impact ("TIME") - More importantly as one looks to the NMS, the competition for relevance, capabilities, and missions becomes a battleground for our enduring political trench warfare. Bosnia (Joint Endeavor) is a prime example of the food fight for missions. My recent assignment provided the opportunity to participate in this fiasco (although marginally

effective). The RC contribution was for the most part effective but, the process was extremely inefficient. We did not meet the CINC's<sup>19</sup> requirements due to the "I wanna play syndrome." The CINC's requirements for individual fillers was seen as a target of opportunity for the Army Reserve and National Guard who tend to stress units more than individuals (perception of relevance). Mobilization procedures and policies provide the template for meeting CINC requirements. The mobilization process, as well as unit integrity, was bastardized to provide individuals assigned to hybrid artificial units.<sup>20</sup> When deployed they reverted back to individual fillers and were scattered throughout Europe. It got to the point that not only did the Army leadership succumb to this process, they allowed the ARNG and USAR to lobby for units to gain their fair share. While marginally effective, it was extremely exacerbating to the supporting staffs and gaining command. Ultimately the gaining command got what he wanted, but during the early stages most were late. As I stated earlier "time" will be the long-pole in the tent. Multiple chains-of-command fighting for their fair share impacts on time. This is always a critical operational factor in the decision-making dilemma for both the supported and supporting CINCs.



While this excursion of efficiency and effectiveness only scratches the surface, it clearly supports the argument that we are paying dearly for a somewhat marginally effective, but disjointed and inefficient Army. This leads to vested and enduring ownership issues.

#### **TOTAL FORCE OWNERSHIP**

America's Army is owned by the people, resourced by Congress and commanded by the President. This logical framework should provide the foundation for the ownership of the "Total Force" as it pertains to America's Army. We need corporate ownership and accountability. As with any corporation (any entity will suffice), the synergistic "systems approach" ties requirements to capabilities and maximizes profit or in our case efficiency. The Army is that entity that must be held responsible and accountable to this nation. Responsibility, accountability and resource maximization are intrinsic to efficiency and **"ownership."** Our current structure does none of the above. It festers competition and eats precious resources as did trench warfare. Ownership is simple, train as you fight implies our allegiance to one master (active Army). They own us, therefore have a vested interest and fiduciary binding that is complementary to their success. No longer can one conveniently point the finger at the other (pick

your component) because of archaic legislative statutes and policy that stymie ownership and efficiency. **One Army, one owner.**

**America's Army Reserve** is the solution. Success is defined as maximized efficiency and a relevant force for the twenty-first century. The Army "Total Force" becomes a reality when we have successfully defined America's Army as:

- America's Army (AA) - Active Component (AC)
- America's Army Reserve (AAR) - Reserve Component (RC)
- America's Army Civilian - Department of Army Civilian (DAC)

The debate is not whether the USAR or ARNG survives, its how we coalesce the strengths of each into the dynamic and lethal battlefield of the twenty-first century. More importantly, we need to build upon the core strengths of the citizen soldier and capitalize on those tangible skills that are easily adapted to many of the NMS challenges. It is not the survival of historical battles or archaic constitutional boundaries (artificial roots for a debate when all else fails), but a future built upon the rich cultural heritage of all past contributions to this nation that will define success. It is time to eliminate the placating and vague terminology carefully written by DOD and all competing interests and place accountability at the table.

Establishment of a bipartisan commission that is tasked to combine the RC thus reducing the layering and bureaucracy of Title 10 execution is key to twenty-first century success. Its charter, goals and objectives are provided by a coalition comprised of the Joint Staff, Congressional Armed Services Committees, and the Secretary of the Army. The commission will maximize efficiency and effectiveness tempered with the win-win contributions of all three components. While the commission would build the template for maximizing gains of systems and organizational effectiveness it must provide for the opportunity to remove artificial and inefficient legislative and parochial boundaries. The answer is not inside the box.<sup>21</sup> The commission must not be constrained and it should use a process similar to the Base Realignment and Closing Commission (BRAC). The commission should be given a set of assumptions that are pertinent and affords the challenges of out of the box excursions. The provided template for assumptions are to establish a baseline for cost and effectiveness excursions and not constrain initiative.

- Basis for study will use current NMS, DPG, and FYDP endstrengths for the baseline.
- Combine the ARNG and USAR components into one America's Army Reserve, a Federal Force.

- Establish a Command and Control structure that places all Army Title 10 responsibility and accountability to the Secretary of the Army.
- Provide appropriate recommendations to Title 10 that will reduce the factor of time by providing individual (25,000 cap) requirement access to DOD prior to PSRC.
- FEMA as the proponent for all domestic national emergencies would gain the responsibility for orchestrating all state assistance outside the control or resources of the state.
- FEMA would establish a state emergency liaison office. This office would have the expertise (military and civilian), the links and nodes to insure prompt and reliable disaster or civil relief as required.
- If required, state militias or civil structure would be resourced by the state and structured to meet the state's needs vice national and strategic needs.

In summary this commission's role must optimize the Command and Control structure. Results for efficiency must be measurable and tangible. Ownership and accountability must be the cornerstone to a revolutionary outcome. Change or revolutions occur only when forced, it doesn't come naturally. The natural tendency for people and organizations is reluctance. Once accomplished the efficiencies gained will intuitively effect the application of operational art.

Operational art is evolving to the reality that significant mindsets must change to meet the dynamic and lethal challenges across the full spectrum of required capabilities in the next century. While **space, time and forces** - continue to influence

the operational and tactical commanders sandbox, the factor of "time" will always be the fulcrum of application and decision-making. The four dominant questions that support operational art and the integration of the principles of war (or military operations other than war) provide the link to national and strategic policy that will inherently affect the operational impact of "time."

What operational level goals or conditions must be achieved in order to meet the nation's strategic objectives?

What sequence of actions must be planned and executed to reach those operational goals?

How should the joint force's assets be applied to accomplish that sequence?

What are the likely derivative cost and risks?

The reality of these four questions is that the RC is integrated into all answers, but without the tenants of AC ownership (train as you fight methodology) and realistic access and time parameters the gaining CINC will always have more "time" unknowns than he needs thus adding more fog to his planning. Our ability to master "time" will be the key factor when reacting to global conflict and military operations other than war.

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- <sup>1</sup> For a complete description of the Reserve Components the reader should refer to *Reserve Components of the Armed Forces*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs, 1995. For the sake of brevity I assume the reader has a conceptual understanding of the RC.
- <sup>2</sup> Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," *Parameters*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 46.
- <sup>3</sup> Total Force Policy established in 1973 under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams, includes all seven Reserve Components and the other services but, for this article I will only address the Army Reserve Components. Throughout the article I will use the both terms, America's Army and Total Force interchangeably.
- <sup>4</sup> Harry G. Summers, Jr. *Washington Times*, "Demonstrating Strength in Reserve," May 16, p. G3
- <sup>5</sup> Jeffery A. Jacobs, *Future of the Citizen Soldier Force*, University Press of Kentucky, 1994, p. 42.
- <sup>6</sup> Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, Summary of AUSA Issue Conference, "Army Total Force and the Reserve Components," Washington, DC: AUSA, May 6, 1991, p. 11.
- <sup>7</sup> The JSCP, part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) provides the strategic guidance including apportionment of resources to the CINCs and Chiefs of Services, to accomplish assigned strategic planning tasks, based on current military capabilities, for the next 18 to 24 months. The CINCs are apportioned forces with associated availability dates for developing operational plans (OPLANS).
- <sup>8</sup> Total Army Analysis (TAA) - Biennial process to support Army force planning and POM force structure. DPG generated scenarios which provide the qualitative and quantitative analysis for generating all required tactical and general support forces necessary to sustain and support divisional and non-divisional forces. Warfighting requirements for the eight ARNG combat divisions do not exist.
- <sup>9</sup> *Army Times*, *CBO Recommends Merging Army Guard, Reserves*, April 21 1997
- <sup>10</sup> Other initiatives and studies talk to a consolidated Personnel Command (PERSCOM) and some even go further with a consolidation of all services reserve components. The studies are too numerous and are beyond the intent of this paper except to validate there is plenty of room to gain efficiencies.
- <sup>11</sup> Macgregor, There are numerous studies that talk to the excess of combat structure in the ARNG. Additionally, there are studies that want to adjust all combat forces for the next century. A recent publication by Macgregor alludes to a restructuring of the ARNG combat forces that would save \$2 billion. While the savings are valid I would contend that his concept of a viable and timely combat force is too large to affect the operational art of application. Brigade and larger size combat organizations can only contribute after 60 to 90 days with the latter being more realistic.
- <sup>12</sup> For an excellent historical and future perspective for the readers to gain an in-depth appreciation of the cultural, political and philosophical framework that underlies our tradition of the citizen-soldier the following books are recommended. *Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, edited by Bennie J. Wilson III (published by National Defense University, 1985) and *Future of the Citizen Soldier Force*, by Jeffrey A Jacobs (published by University Press of Kentucky, 1994)
- <sup>13</sup> Army Total Obligation Authority (TOA) is approximately \$60.1B. Of this \$9.5B goes to ARNG and \$4.3B to the USAR.

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<sup>14</sup> Jeffery A. Jacobs, *Future of the Citizen Soldier Force*, University Press of Kentucky, 1994, p. 42

<sup>15</sup> The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 eliminated the Officer and Enlisted Reserve Corps and established our current Reserve categories (for a current tutorial see *Reserve Components of the Armed Forces*, Office of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense Reserve Affairs, 1995). Thus the Organized Reserve Corps became the Army Reserve.

<sup>16</sup> Far too many to list, sampling provided for the reader to gain an appreciation of magnitude and sources.

Armed Forces Journal: *Total Disagreement in the Total Army; Its Time to Bite the Bullet; Turn Out the Lights, Lock the Gate; One Team, One Force; A Double Standard*, September 1996

Parameters, *The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power*, Autumn 1996

Army Times, *In Reserve - Combat Troops Devour Funds at Expense of Critical Needs*, July 17, 1995

Army Times, *Walk A Mile in the Guard's Shoes*, September 23 1996

Army Times, *CBO Recommends Merging Army Guard, Reserves*, April 21 1997

Army Times, *Commentary, Proposal Didn't Go Far Enough*, May 5 1997

Reserve Officers Association (ROA), *Antagonism Between the Active and Reserve Components in Historical Context*, October 1995

<sup>17</sup> This is based on current strategy (two MRCs) and the configuration of current force structure. The Total Army Analysis (model which ties CS/CSS forces to DPG scenarios and links DPG to POM) clearly shows the mismatch of forces.

<sup>18</sup> See United States Department of the Army, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*, Field Manual 100-17, Chapter 2 for a comprehensive synopsis of Command and Planning systems.

<sup>19</sup> In this case, EUCOM is the gaining supported CINC.

<sup>20</sup> FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM) established derivative unit identification codes (UICs) and the units were filled with a mixture of individual volunteers, unit members from assorted units and parent unit members who were involuntarily mobilized. While everyone had a can-do attitude the results were mixed.

<sup>21</sup> This commission could for all intentional purposes could be moved up a notch and address all seven RCs. At a minimum the reduction from seven to five is and should be accomplished, the combining of the two Army RC components and combining of the Air National Guard into the USAF Reserve.

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